U21B-01 INVITED 08:00h
Hubbert's Peak: the Impending World oil Shortage
Global oil production will probably reach a peak sometime during this decade. After the peak, the world's production of crude oil will fall, never to rise again. The world will not run out of energy, but developing alternative energy sources on a large scale will take at least 10 years. The slowdown in oil production may already be beginning; the current price fluctuations for crude oil and natural gas may be the preamble to a major crisis. In 1956, the geologist M. King Hubbert predicted that U.S. oil production would peak in the early 1970s.1 Almost everyone, inside and outside the oil industry, rejected Hubbert's analysis. The controversy raged until 1970, when the U.S. production of crude oil started to fall. Hubbert was right. Around 1995, several analysts began applying Hubbert's method to world oil production, and most of them estimate that the peak year for world oil will be between 2004 and 2008. These analyses were reported in some of the most widely circulated sources: Nature, Science, and Scientific American.2 None of our political leaders seem to be paying attention. If the predictions are correct, there will be enormous effects on the world economy. Even the poorest nations need fuel to run irrigation pumps. The industrialized nations will be bidding against one another for the dwindling oil supply. The good news is that we will put less carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. The bad news is that my pickup truck has a 25-gallon tank.
U21B-02 INVITED 08:25h
The New Pessimism about Petroleum Resources: Debunking the Hubbert Model (and Hubbert Modelers)
Recently, numerous publications have appeared warning that oil production is near an unavoidable, geologically-determined peak that could have consequences up to and including "war, starvation, economic recession, possibly even the extinction of homo sapiens" (Campbell in Ruppert 2002) The current series of alarmist articles could be said to be merely reincarnations of earlier work which proved fallacious, but the authors insist that they have made significant advances in their analyses, overcoming earlier errors. For a number of reasons, this work has been nearly impenetrable to many observers, which seems to have lent it an added cachet. However, careful examination of the data and methods, as well as extensive perusal of the writings, suggests that the opacity of the work is-at best-obscuring the inconclusive nature of their research. Some of the arguments about resource scarcity resemble those made in the 1970s. They have noted that discoveries are low (as did Wilson, 1977), and that most estimates of ultimately recoverable resources (URR) are in the range of 2 trillion barrels, approximately twice production to date. But beyond that, Campbell and Laherrere in particular claim that they have developed accurate estimates of URR, and thus, unlike earlier work, theirs is more scientific and reliable. In other words, this time the wolf is really here. But careful examination of their work reveals instead a pattern of errors and mistaken assumptions presented as conclusive research results.
U21B-03 INVITED 08:50h
Out of gas: the end of the age of oil
The world will start to run out of cheap, conventionally produced oil much sooner than most people expect, possibly within this decade. This talk will discuss the reasoning that leads to that conclusion and the likely consequences if it is correct. It may be possible, with considerable difficulty to substitute other fossil fuels for the missing oil, but if we do that we may do irreparable damage to Earth's climate. And even then we would start to run out of all fossil fuels, including coal, probably within this century. Can civilization survive if that happens? We will consider the possibilities.
U21B-04 INVITED 09:15h
Global Oil: Relax, the End Is Not Near
Global oil production will peak within the next 25 to 30 years, but peaking will be a function of demand, not supply, as the methane economy comes into full play. Analysts who predict near-term peaking of global oil production generally use some variant of Hubbert's symmetrical life cycle method. The amount of ultimately recoverable oil is assumed to be known and peaking will occur when half that amount is exhausted. In reality, ultimate recovery volumes are not known, but estimated, and estimates vary by a factor of two; production profiles are not necessarily symmetrical. Further assumptions are that the resource base is inelastic, not significantly expandable through technology and new concepts. The historical experience is quite to the contrary. Projections of near-term peaking ignore or discount field reserve growth, the most dynamic element in reserve additions of the past 25 years and one with the future potential equal to that of new field discovery. Future global demand for oil will likely amount to between 1.5 to 2.0 trillion barrels, well within the more realistic estimates of global recovery volumes. The real challenge is not oil, but natural gas where future global demand will likely exceed 25,000 trillion cubic feet. But it too will be met in sufficient volumes to bring us into the hydrogen economy some 50 to 60 years from now.
U21B-05 09:40h
The Model-Independent Growing Oil Problem
The debate rages on whether M. K. Hubbert's model-based prediction regarding the inevitability of oil production decline is correct or not. However simple model-independent projections illuminate the magnitude of the oil (and similarly gas) supply challenges the world is beginning to face now. Current worldwide demand is increasing at a rate of 2-3 percent a year. But as many economies are experiencing accelerated growth, this rate may grow in the near future. The numbers below show the magnitude of the challenge this sort of growth will pose. For example to bring per capita oil consumption in China and India to present world average level will require a 35 percent increase in annual production, or to elevate world average per capita consumption to 25 percent of US level will require a 50 percent increase in annual production. All indications are that these sorts of added demand levels will be extremely difficult to meet both in terms of production rate and resource replacement and therefore pose a coupled economic and security risk to the world.