Discussion of an example, the potential for rapid climate change (called a climate shift), can illustrate what is meant by socially relevant science. In this case Members of Congress, Federal policy makers, State and local officials, and private officials are all potential users of scientific information.
Emerging evidence seems to indicate that the Earth's climate is metastable, i.e., that it can shift rapidly between significantly different but relatively stable regimes. There is a possibility that increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases could trigger such a shift. This is a facet of our ecologic crisis. Although not yet conclusive, the evidence seems adequate to ask what such shifts might mean for policy. This raises two subsidiary questions for purposes of policy: what is a ``rapid'' shift? and what are ``significantly different'' climate regimes?
For policy ``rapid'' means that the time for the climate shift is less than or comparable to characteristic social response times. That is, it occurs too fast for policies of adaptation or mitigation to be implemented before impacts of the change. Consider the following subjective estimates of various characteristic social response times:
The parameters of ``significantly different'' climate regimes, such as temperature or precipitation distributions, would be different enough to have social, economic, or political impacts comparable to the impacts of other events such as an epidemic, a war, or a major development in technology. Some parameter changes, perhaps in distribution of cloud types, might be of research interest but not socially significant. In other words ``significance'' is measured in social, not meteorological, terms.
Much research has been conducted on potential impacts of climate change---sea level rise, drought and crop failures, migrations. Even slow change can cause significant impacts. If changes occur over several decades, then in the U.S. our rapid social metabolism and large capital stocks may allow us to adapt---up to a point. For example, if our climate were to change in a way to require new buildings, and if the change occurred over 200 years, rapid turnover in our inventory of buildings would enable us to keep up with the rate of change at little cost. Other countries, such as Bangladesh, may have much more difficulty. (note: It could be argued that ``low-tech'' economies might adapt to climate change easily, having less capital to modify or sacrifice. But such adaptation might come at the cost of lives. The U.S. might lose much more capital and many fewer lives.) That is, for the U.S. if changes are much slower than our social metabolism then the rate of change itself is not a first order problem, although of course the magnitude of change could become one. But if changes are faster, then the rate itself can be a problem, even for smaller changes. For example, if over a few years there occurs a global climate shift large enough to disrupt agriculture globally, impacts might be comparable to global war---even if in the long term the new climate regime would allow an adapted agriculture to grow adequate food.
On the positive side observation of a clearly visible, rapid shift might lead to the recognition that we are adversely perturbing the Earth systems on which we depend, and stimulate a coherent, if belated, response. It might also induce a complementary cultural shift away from the faith in science and technology which is one of the defining characteristics of Western culture, toward a healthier humility in the presence of nature. Such a cultural shift would change the liberal ideology Fukuyama described. History may not have ended; liberalism must adapt to survive.
Research on rapid climate shifts can be socially useful; it can affect policy because of the large potential impact of such a shift. As a result of this research, however, scientists may present decision makers with another new problem. Currently many decision makers perceive climate change to be remote in time and space, to happen decades hence over the ocean or in the stratosphere. To be presented with a climate shift problem requiring immediate attention would be an unpleasant surprise. Of course, there may be no problem if research on rapid climate shift proves conclusively that present trends are not making the climate unstable. This too would be a socially useful result.
Do decision makers want information on the possibility of such rapid climate shifts? Probably not today, when it is only a worry. A new problem is unlikely to be one they were elected to deal with. As we have seen above, no one official has direct, comprehensive responsibility for dealing with the problem of global change; officials are not sitting with clean desks waiting for key information before springing into action; and they want solutions not problems---yet this could be a big, new problem. Further, they want silver bullet solutions, with no side effects, particularly with no political costs.
If research is highly persuasive that a climate shift is likely (not predicted), scientists may approach relevant decision makers---potential users of the information---to ensure the information is heard, correctly interpreted, and applied. Scientists might find that the users dodge involvement. Although scientists don't want to involve users, especially politicians, in their program decision processes, the users tend to accept the exclusion because they thereby avoid the hard work of deciding what information is needed and on what information to base decisions. More importantly, most politicians do not seek the kind of tough political issues that would be connected with a potential climate shift. Rather, believing that science ultimately solves problems, they sometimes use research to postpone, perhaps for the rest of their political career, the need to face such issues.
What makes a ``tough'' political issue? An issue appears tough when it seems that however it is decided many constituents will be unhappy. Few elected officials can handle many such issues and stay in office. Consider an example: Calvert, et al. [1993] show that to achieve air quality standards in Southern California it may be necessary to more strictly regulate older autos which are disproportionately high emitters of pollutants. Few people drive such cars by choice; thus regulation aimed at old cars would tend to hit lower income drivers---typically old, poor, or minority. Resolution of the issue could anger either environmental or low-income groups. The point is, useful science can raise ethical questions---e.g. about equity of pollution control---and force decision makers to face troublesome, divisive issues.
Should it turn out that a rapid climate shift is likely and if enough decision makers and citizen leaders can be convinced of the importance of this before a shift occurs, we may be able to design policies of resilience which would serve us well in many ways. For example, a grain reserve against disruptive climate shift might also serve as a reserve against other events such as epidemic crop disease. (Getting such policies implemented would be a tough problem.) This makes research on rapid climate shifts very important, and suggests its conduct should be careful, open, rigorous, committed, and generally with awareness of the context in which its results will be received. This is the kind of awareness of context that Representative Brown calls for.
Here is a paradox and a temptation: Based on the myth of omnipotent science, officials push science to address and solve social problems. Science, true to its culture (in particular the Vannevar Bush model which says that since social benefits flow automatically from basic research, there is no need to focus on practical problems), resists applied research assignments. When science does turn its attention to a tough problem like climate shift, rather than making it go away as officials hope, science may paradoxically make it unavoidable---leaving both parties to the social contract unhappy. There is a temptation for both to avoid engaging tough issues, i.e., for Congress to lecture science about doing the right thing, and for science to insist that (according to its model) basic research is the right thing to do. This would be negative synergy. If science is allowed to pursue what it prefers, i.e., basic research and models that take decades to develop, Congress may be able to avoid a set of tough issues until the ecologic crisis---perhaps a climate shift---is unambiguous and unavoidable. Something like this may exist in the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP).