The AGU Congressional Science Fellowship offers scientists a very special opportunity to become directly involved in public policy making at the federal level.  At this year's AGU Congressional Science Fellow, I have been working for Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.) as his legislative assistant for environment and energy matters.  I would like to describe some of my impressions so far regarding the role of science in public policy.

My sudden transition from academic science to the political arena highlighted for me the differences between the two, which are striking and at times disconcerting.  Academic scientists, laden with teaching and often administrative responsibilities, are fond of complaining of the lack of time for creative research and thinking.  But, for the most part, they are in an environment that supports and encourages research and independent thinking.  In the political world such words as 'professor' and 'research' can be pejorative or, at best, quaint; professors and research reports may be taken seriously only when they support a given political viewpoint.

On the other hand, the political complaint about 'two-handed' scientists suggests with some justification that scientists are often not 'up front' about the meaning and significance of their work.  It is not just that scientists play on ambiguity and often refuse to take sides in controversial issues; politicians of course do this too (and more capably).  But because they are not often required to justify their work, as politicians are, scientists are not always as conscientious in pulling their work together and explaining its purposes clearly in their writings.

Despite these obvious differences, there is a parallel between scientific and political positions in the way factual information is used, and this can be useful in understanding the role of science in public policy.  A scientific position (conclusion, finding, or theory) is developed from a set of facts about natural phenomena; but, particularly when a position is controversial or preliminary, the facts used to support it are selected among a much larger array of facts and related phenomena, not all of which necessarily support that position.  (Of course, a reasonable position must not be strongly contradicted.)  In a similar way, political positions are developed, justified, and defended on the basis of a certain set of facts.  Those who hold opposite positions appeal to another set of facts, often complementary to the first.  It is the selection and combination of facts that, as in a scientific position, make the case for a political viewpoint.

Now, the role of science in the formulation of public policy is somewhat analogous to the role of facts in either scientific or political positions.  The purely scientific aspects of an issue are one step removed from the political process; the results of scientific inquiry, however, play much the same role as any other kind of fact.  A scientist's interpretation of a complicated technological or scientific issue of public significance, such as nuclear waste disposal or acid precipitation, become a factual 'finding' on which to base a certain political position.  Conflicting scientific interpretations can be used by different sides to support conflicting political positions.  Hence, each side may have its 'darling' scientist, and a Congressional hearing may seem to support a particular political position.  The subordinate role of science per se also helps explain why politicians are impatient with the complex reasoning and factual documentation that lead up to a scientific conclusion, since it is only the latter which has any direct usefulness in the political process.  The practice of science, then, is one step removed from public policy, but its results are directly linked as 'factual' evidence.

This formulation may appear to diminish the role that science can play in determining public policy, but I think that it accurately reflects the distinction that must be drawn between science and policy making.  Although science inevitably incorporates certain values, science alone can never determine how our society decides among competing or conflicting needs and goals.  These can be determined only by social and political priorities.  Science can, however, play a role in ensuring that decisions are made with clear understanding of the problem and its possible consequences and likely solutions.

The challenge for a scientist in the public arena is to be faithful to both ends of the decision process, scientific and political.  One must first get an accurate scientific picture of a problem, using the best scientific judgment in the selection and consideration of facts.  Then one must put that scientific picture in the political context and determine what political, economic, and social forces impinge on it.  Parts of the picture may emerge more clearly or forcefully and parts may fade from view, but the original scientific picture should not thereby become distorted.  Policy will emerge from all of these considerations, and if the politics on which it is based are reasonably wholesome, none of the 'facts' on which it is based should be compromised.

This combination of science and policy is well illustrated in the current issue of acid precipitation.  One can easily get immersed in the complexities and uncertainties of the scientific issue in considering reaction rates, catalysts and limiting factors, transport from source to receptor, and effects on soils, lakes, and biota.  Although many of the critical links in acid precipitation are not yet scientifically established, the overall picture -- the trend -- is apparent to some extent, and both the public and its public servants are demanding 'facts' from scientists to justify either a program of control or a policy of delay.  It is clear, however, that scientific certainty alone can not determine a decision on acid precipitation control, for that is ultimately a political choice among values: ecological and possible health effects compete with economic costs and social disruption.  The scientific aspect of the issue concerns what, where, and how much to control; but the decision of whether or not to control acid precipitation and to what degree is ultimately political.

Thus, a Congressional Fellow must extend the comfortable universe of scientific knowledge into a somewhat alien realm where it must compete with other considerations on a more or less equal basis.  Congress is, after all, like a vast marketplace, and politics at its best is the making of choices among the 'common wealth.'  Certainly only by understanding, and not ignoring, the political process can scientists hope to see public policies made in accordance with good scientific thinking.

Arthur B. Weissman, AGU Congressional Science Fellow, 1982-1983.

Return to AGU's Congressional Science Fellowship page
Return to Science and Policy